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Between Two Evils  
















Recent  empirical  studies  claim  that,  in  addition  to  levels  of  corruption, 
investors are deterred by its unpredictability. I claim instead that it is petty 
corruption  that  deters  investors.  I  employ  seven  subcomponents  of 
corruption for a sample of 102 countries that appear in the 2003 Global 
Competitiveness Report of the WEF. The second principal component of 
this data depicts a grand, political type, embracing corruption in government 
policymaking and in judicial decisions as opposed to corruption in public 
utilities  and  loan  applications.  Grand  corruption  less  deters  investors 
because they might feel belonging to an inner circle of insiders that can 
profit from hidden arrangements. Grand corruption also entails relatively 
smaller organizational effort. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: C21, F21, 017, K42  
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1.  Introduction 
When I talked to representatives of the German industry some years ago, they proudly 
mentioned how corruption functioned in Indonesia under Suharto. German investors 
would  just  go  “top  down”,  involving  a  high  ranking  Suharto  crony  and  being  safe 
thereafter from any type of corrupt requests. As opposed to this, corruption in other 
countries is arduous and time consuming. It is this difference that this paper is about. 
While  the  data  on  FDI  confirms  the  arguments  of  the  representatives,  theoretical 
reasoning suggests that we need not be sympathetic to the investor’s calculus.  
 
The adverse impact of corruption, defined as the misuse of public power for private 
benefit, is empirically well established. There exists strong empirical support for the 
adverse impact of corruption on the ratio of investment to GDP, [Mauro 1995 and 1997, 
Campos,  Lien  and  Pradhan  1999,  Brunetti,  Kisunko  and  Weder  1997:  23  and  25; 
Brunetti and Weder 1998; Gymiah-Brempong 2002]. There is equally strong support for 
corruption lowering the growth of GDP, [Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Leite 
and Weidmann 1999: 24; Poirson 1998: 16; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Méon and 
Sekkat  2003;  Gymiah-Brempong  2002].  In  some  studies  this  relationship  becomes 
insignificant once controlling for investment, suggesting that corruption largely impedes 
growth  by  lowering  capital  accumulation,  [Mauro  1995;  Mo  2001].  Other  studies 
revealed a significant adverse impact of corruption on productivity [Lambsdorff 2003a], 
on government services and health care, [Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2001] on the 
composition of government expenditures, [Mauro 1998 and 1997; Gupta, Davoodi and 
Alonso-Terme 2002; Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2000] and on tax revenues [Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001].  
 
The  adverse  impact  of  corruption  on  foreign  direct  investments  is  equally  well 
established.  One  insignificant  finding  is  reported  by  Alesina  and  Weder  [1999], 
however, the authors make use of a variable by ICRG that does not determine levels of 
corruption  but  the  political  instability  due  to  corruption.  This  variable,  however, 
depends  not  only  on  levels  of  corruption  but  also  on  the  population’s  intolerance 
towards  corruption.  The  insignificant  finding  should  thus  not  be  overrated.
2  Other 
investigations  are  clearly  supportive  to  corruption  lowering  FDI,  [Wei  2000b, 
Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei 2000c; Wei and Wu 2001; Habib and Zurawicki 2001; 
2002]. Lambsdorff [2003b] shows that overall capital inflows of a country deteriorate 
with corruption.  
 
However, the extent to which different types of corruption may exert different impacts 
has  hardly  been  addressed  up  to  now.  Corruption  embraces  a  variety  of  different 
activities such as the embezzlement of public funds in public utilities, the extortion of 
speed  money  in  exchange  for  lowering  tax  assessments,  commissions  to 
parliamentarians  in  exchange  for  favorable  legislation  and  bribery  in  exchange  for 
public contracts. Each of these actions is likely to exert different consequences.  
 
The only difference in types of corruption that has been the subject of research lately 
relates to predictability and opportunism. The World Bank [1997: 34] argued: "There 
are two kinds of corruption. The first is one where you pay the regular price and you get 
                                                 
2 Alesina and Weder (1999) also briefly state estimates using different data on corruption. Due to the 
brevity it is difficult to judge on the findings. The data on corruption are more recent while the FDI-data 
refer to 1970-1995, which may have introduced a downward bias to the results.   
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what you want. The second is one where you pay what you have agreed to pay and you 
go home and lie awake every night worrying whether you will get it or if somebody is 
going to blackmail you instead." This idea was picked up in a survey by the World Bank 
and the University of Basel. In addition to an overall level of corruption also its predict-
ability and the absence of opportunism was determined. This embraced, first, whether 
the costs of corruption are known in advance and, second, whether after making the 
payment the service is delivered as promised instead of office holder opportunistically 
forgetting  their  promises.  The  resulting  impact  of  these  variables  on  the  ratio  of 
investment to GDP was investigated by the World Bank [1997]. In a sample of 39 
industrial  and  developing  countries,  it  was  concluded  that  for  a  given  level  of 
corruption,  countries  with  more  predictable  and  less  opportunistic  corruption  have 
higher investment rates. This approach has been extended and corroborated by Campos, 
Lien and Pradhan [1999]. The authors conclude that the nature of corruption is also 
crucial to its economic effects. Lambsdorff [2003b: 237] confirms that opportunism, 
alongside with levels of corruption, reduces a country’s annual capital inflows. 
 
But,  besides  predictability,  corruption  differs  in  many  further  respects.  This  study 
argues  that  it  is  rather  the  petty  type  of  corruption  that  deters  investors.  This  is 
investigated  by  focusing  on  the  impact  of  corruption  on  foreign  direct  investments 
(FDI).  I will employ the data on corruption by the World Economic Forum, which 
provides  a  more  detailed  assessment  of  corruption  among  various  government 
functions. Section 2 provides theoretical reasoning for an impact of the level and type of 
corruption on FDI. Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 investigates empirically, how 
different types of corruption impact on FDI. Corruption in public utilities is found to 
have the largest deterrent affect on FDI, while corruption in government programs least 
deters  FDI.  The  data  is  further  investigated  with  the  help  of  principal  component 
analysis. Section 5 reveals that the second component is related to grand corruption. 
Section  6  employs  the  detected  components  in  regressions  on  FDI.  I  confirm  the 
significance of the first component and show that also the second component has a 
significant impact on FDI. This can be related to the increased organizational efforts 
required for petty corruption in public utilities and loan application, which, I argue, are 
more likely areas for extortion. In contrast to this, investors may consider engagement 
in grand corruption as a voluntary decision where they are part of the negotiations. They 
exert  much  better  control  over  the  outcome,  and  may  even  profit  personally  by 
defrauding their own firms. Section 7 proposes policy reform based on the findings and 
concludes. 
 
2.  Why is corruption deterring foreign investors? 
There  are  convincing  reasons  as  to  why  international  investors  are  deterred  by 
corruption. Corruption has been shown to promulgate cumbersome regulation, inducing 
public  office  holders  to  create  artificial  bottlenecks.  Internationals  investors  are 
adversely  affected  due  to  increasing  red  tape.  For  example,  market  entry  has  been 
shown to deteriorate with high levels of corruption, suggesting that FDI are reduced, 
[Djankov et al. 2000: 40 and 47].  
 
Akin to a standard adverse selection problem, corruption also induces the selection of 
the wrong firms, that is, those who are more willing to offer bribes and more skilled in 
arranging hidden payments. International investors would be would be cautious in their 
entry decisions because their advantages in “know-how” are offset by their ignorance 
with respect to “know-who”. Corruption requires trusted relationships that guarantee the 
enforcement of the corrupt agreement, [Lambsdorff 2002a]. The necessary trust is more  
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likely  to  develop  at  the  local  level.  Another  distortion  arises  when  bribers  request 
bureaucrats and politicians to harass their competitors, [Bardhan 1997: 1322]. Local 
firms are likely to have an edge over their international competitors in arranging such 
impediments. Due to this local capture FDI flows would be distorted towards the home 
market  in  case  of  high  levels  of  corruption.  Gross  FDI  inflows  would  suffer  from 
corruption by deterring international investors.
3  
 
Another  problem  faced  by  international  investors  relates  to  the  security  of  their 
property. This type of security would suffer under kleptocratic rulers. Such a corrupt 
ruler  will  not  be  able  to  credibly  commit  himself  to  policies,  [Stiglitz  1998:  8-11; 
DeLong  and  Shleifer  1993;  Rose-Ackerman  1999:  118;  Grossman  and  Noh  1994; 
Charap  and  Harm  2000].  Once  investments  are  sunk  they  become  vulnerable  to 
extortion because kleptocrats are not motivated to honor their commitments, nor are 
they sufficiently constrained to do so, [Ades and Di Tella 1997: 1026; Mauro 1995]. 
Governments with a reputation for corruption find it difficult to commit to effective 
policies and to convince investors of their achievements. Corruption therefore deters 
investors because it goes along with a lacking respect for law, Lambsdorff [2003b].
4  
 
But the aforementioned arguments relate to corruption in a broad perspective. It remains 
to be explored, which type of corruption might deter investors the most. Corruption 
embraces a variety of different government functions, all of which may be of different 
relevance in the eyes of an international investor. While the issue of predictability has 
been  investigated  up  to  now,  in  practice  corruption  can  relate  to  various  different 
government functions. Data on corruption in different government functions is available 
for 1) export and import permits, 2) getting connected to public utilities (e.g., telephone 
or  electricity),  3)  annual  tax  payments,  4)  public  contracts,  5)  loan  applications,  6) 
influencing laws and policies, regulations, or decrees to favor selected business interests 
or  7)  getting  favorable  judicial  decisions.  While  this  list  may  not  be  exhaustive,  it 
captures and groups the most important areas where the government interacts with the 
business sector. I consider these government functions to differ in two major respects. 
 
Organizational ease. Corruption can be either petty or grand. Petty corruption is the 
everyday, street-level type of corruption that involves small payments, speed money and 
tips to people low in the hierarchy. These payments are particularly time consuming, 
thus imposing additional costs to investors. For example, Kaufmann and Wei [1999] 
prove that high levels of corruption are positively associated with the time managers 
waste with bureaucrats. This issue appears particularly relevant for petty corruption.
5 
Petty corruption can also involve extortion. Public office holders may charge a fee in 
addition  to  the  official  amount.  They  may  threaten  harassment  or  delays  until  this 
payment is made. This type of corruption clearly differs from bribery, which relates to 
deliberate  cooperation.  The  cooperative  type  of  corruption  places  third  parties  at  a 
disadvantage while pleasing those who are directly involved. A country’s reputation for 
                                                 
3 Net FDI inflows may be less affected by corruption because local investors would seize local (corrupt) 
opportunities rather than invest abroad. 
4 In Lambsdorff [2003b] an index of law and order obtains the expected impact on a country’s capital 
inflows. In this paper, the impact of law and order on FDI has been tested but found to be insignificant. 
The results are not reported. 
5 Petty corruption might be more frequent and due to repetitive exchange the actors are provided with an 
instrument  for  avoiding  opportunism,  [Pechlivanos  2004].  But  grand  corruption  allows  for  more 
sophisticated designs of the corrupt exchange. E.g., politicians are engaged in a multitude of different 
activities, commercial or non-commercial. They can be compensated by deepening commercial exchange 
or by supporting their non-commercial interests. Such long-term engagement would disallow them to 
renege on the terms of an agreement, making opportunism less likely, [Lambsdorff and Teksoz 2004].  
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extortion is likely to deter investors, because this type of corruption would be beyond 
the  immediate  control  and  voluntary  engagement,  requiring  further  organizational 
safeguards and calculations. A country’s reputation for collusion might be lesser of a 
deterrent for international investors, because it signals to them that their freedom of 
choice would be honored.  
 
The organizational ease differs from predictability, which has formerly been regarded a 
crucial aspect of corruption. Frequent payments for licenses might be well predictable 
but still require immense efforts among investors. On the other hand, the precise benefit 
of informal relations to high ranking politicians might be unpredictable but still satisfy 
investors. In this perspective I consider organizational ease to be more important as 
compared to aspects of predictability.  
 
Opportunities  for  fraud.  Investors  sometimes  observe  possibilities  to  misuse  the 
secrecy surrounding corrupt deals to increase their own income, defrauding their firm or 
their shareholders. In this spirit, Alesina and Weder [1999] argue that corruption may 
also attract FDI once investors belong to the inner circle of those profiting from bribery. 
While recognizing this impact, I contend that it is not strong enough to outbalance the 
negative overall effect of corruption on FDI, which is empirically well established. Still, 
it may be certain types of corruption that are particularly attractive to such fraudulent 
investors. Those deciding on investment will consider differences between grand and 
petty corruption. They will be directly involved in arranging deals of grand corruption. 
But the petty corruption that takes place will be beyond their immediate control and is 
likely to be delegated to local staff, making it unattractive to fraudsters. Winston [1979: 
840-1] and Shleifer and Vishny [1993] argue that the risk associated with corruption 
increases with the number of transactions, the number of people involved, the duration 
of the transaction and the simplicity and standardization of the procedure. Because the 
risk does not clearly increase with the value of a transaction, large, one-shot purchases 
create  a  more  efficient  base  for  a  kickback.  Winston  argues  that  public  servants 
therefore bias their decision in favor of capital intensive, technologically sophisticated 
and custom-built products and technologies. The same can be said about fraudulent 
investors.  Grand  corruption,  particularly  in  public  contracts  as  well  as  in  laws  and 
policies, appears to provide a good base for such fraudulent behavior.  
 
Corruption  in  public  utilities  and  loan  applications  often  involves  extortion  because 
there is a clear official service that is requested. Payments to office holders tend to be 
made in order to avoid harassment and delay, in rare cases to avoid the official fee. 
Although there are exceptions, petty corruption requires time consuming negotiations 
over  prices,  frequent  confrontation  with  requests  and  additional  organizational 
requirements. 
 
Public contracts are less likely to involve extortion. This is rather a government function 
where private firms are free to decide by themselves whether to pay bribes or not. 
Corruption  in  public  utilities  often  happens  after  investors  have  sunk  their  costs, 
whereas  corruption  in  public  contracts  arises  during  the  process  of  tender,  in  other 
words, before investors have committed their resources. At the same time, corruption in 
public contracts, laws and policies and judicial decisions tends to be rather grand. Those 
deciding on laws, policies and public contracts tend to be higher in hierarchy. Investors 
would be directly involved in negotiating the bribe and may observe the opportunity to 
pocket part of the payment for themselves. 
  
  7 
In sum, two types of corruption must be distinguished: A petty type of corruption which 
is arduous to organize, embracing corruption in public utilities and loan applications. 
The second sort of corruption is a rather grand, political type, embracing corruption in 
government  policymaking  and  in  judicial  decisions.  This  second  type  is  easier  to 
organize and offers opportunities for fraudulent investors.  
 
3.  Description of the Data  
The dependent variable for this study is the gross FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
for  the  period  1995  to  2003.  The  annual  dollar  value  of  FDI  are  from  the  IFM 
International Financial Statistics, code 78BEDZF, each divided by the 2000 GDP in 
international  US  dollars  (determined  on  ppp-Basis)  from  the  World  Development 
Indicators. I delete Luxembourg from the sample of countries because FDI data relate 
partly  to  the  total  of  Europe,  rather  than  to  Luxembourg  itself.  Theoretically  only 
positive values are possible for such gross data. However, if FDI already calculated in 
previous periods are withdrawn, in rare cases negative numbers can arise. The data on 
FDI are best dealt with in logarithmic form. Due to a few values that are close or below 
zero, I add the constant value 0.01 percent of GDP prior to taking the logarithm.  
 
The detailed data on subcomponents of corruption relating to 102 countries comes from 
the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report 2003/04.These 
variables are constructed as the average response (mostly more than 50) from survey 
questions asking the respondents the following questions:  
 
1.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented  extra  payments  or  bribes  connected  with  export  and  import 
permits? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
2.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented  extra  payments  or  bribes  when  getting  connected  to  public 
utilities (eg, telephone or electricity)? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
3.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with annual tax payments? 
(1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
4.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented  extra  payments  or  bribes  connected  with  public  contracts 
(investment projects)? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
5.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with loan applications? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
6.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with influencing laws and 
policies,  regulations,  or  decrees  to  favor  selected  business  interests?  (1  = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
7.  In  your  industry,  how  commonly  would  you  estimate  that  firms  make 
undocumented  extra  payments  or  bribes  connected  with  getting  favorable 
judicial decisions? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Further  data  from  the  same  survey  has  been  used  to  assess  the  absence  of  Legal 
Political Donations (WEF 2003; “To what extent do legal contributions to political 
parties have a direct influence on specific public policy outcomes? 1 = very close link 
between donations and policy, 7 = little direct influence on policy”), Public Trust in 
Politicians (WEF 2003 “Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians is 1 = very  
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low, 7 = very high”) and the extent of bureaucratic red tape (WEF 2003 “How much 
time does your firm’s senior management spend dealing/negotiating with government 
officials (as a percentage of work time)? 1 = 0%, 2 = 1–10%, 3 = 11–20%, 8 = 81–
100%”). 
 
Further explanatory variables are openness (the sum of imports and exports of goods 
and services relative to GDP; data from the World Development Indicators, average 
data 1996-2002), Population (data refer to 2001 and are from the World Development 
Indicators),  export  of  fuels  relative  to  merchandise  exports  (World  Development 
Indicators,  average    1994-2003),  growth  of  GDP  (World  Development  Indicators, 
average 1990-1995), the share of Protestants (La Porta et al. 1999 and CIA factbook – 
where the latter provided only qualitative descriptions a quantitative estimate has been 
provided by the author) and distance to global investors (the sum of the distance to 
Chicago and that to Frankfurt. Data on latitude and longitude is from the CIA factbook 
and the distances determined according to spherical trigonometry). 
 
4.  Simple regression and Principal Component Analysis 
 
Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares,
 a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows  
relative to GDP, logged, 1995-2003 
Independent Variables  1.   2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7 
-0.689  0.310  -0.190  -0.701  -0.817  -1.096  -1.032  Constant 
(-0.8)  (0.4)  (-0.2)  (-0.8)  (-0.9)  (-1.3)  (-1.2) 
0.175  -0.104  0.069  0.251  0.128  0.314  0.346  GDP per head, log.  
(1.4)  (-0.7)  (0.5)  (2.0)  (0.9)  (2.7)  (2.9) 
0.374              Absence of Corruption, 
Export and Import  (3.6)             
  0.635            Absence of Corruption, 
Public Utilities    (5.2)           
    0.453          Absence of Corruption, 
Tax Payments      (4.0)         
      0.281        Absence of Corruption, 
Public Contracts        (2.9)       
        0.467      Absence of Corruption, 
Loan Applications          (3.7)     
          0.227    Absence of Corruption, 
Laws and Policies            (2.3)   
            0.134  Absence of Corruption, 
Judicial Decisions              (1.6) 
Obs.  95  95  95  95  95  95  95 
R
2  0.32  0.39  0.35  0.29  0.33  0.28  0.26 
Adj. R
2  0.30  0.38  0.33  0.28  0.31  0.26  0.24 
Jarque-Bera
b)  0.4  3.8  0.9  0.4  1.1  0.4  0.1 
a)  White corrected t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
b) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its 
skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal distribution can be clearly rejected for levels 
above 6 
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Table  1  reports  the  results  of  the  regressions  to  establish  the  simple  link  between 
corruption and FDI. The cross-section regressions model is specified in the following 
way:  
( ) 0 1 2 ln _ i i i i i FDI GDP Absence corruption X β β β ε = + + + , 
where i is the country subscript. X is a vector of all the control variables other than 
corruption, β2 is a vector of the corresponding coefficients and ￿ is a random error term. 
GDP per capita aims to capture the effect of decreasing returns to scale that induces rich 
countries to transfer capital to poor countries. I start with a simple specification where 
further explanatory variables are disregarded.  
 
As shown in table 1, absence of corruption in public utilities has the strongest positive 
impact  on  FDI.  In  contrast, 
absence of corruption in law and 
policies and in judicial decisions 
is  considerably  lower.  This  is 
supportive  to  the  theoretical 
arguments.  Considering  all  data 
on  corruption  simultaneously 
would  not  be  possible  due  to 
severe  problems  with 
multicollinearity. But we can determine an index on grand-predictable corruption by 
applying principal component analysis to the seven indicators. The results are in table 2.  
 
The  second  component  has  an 
Eigenvalue  clearly  below  the  Kaiser 
criterion of 1. It might thus be suspected 
to  represent  merely  noise.  However, 
such a conclusion is inappropriate. First, 
the overall perceived level of corruption 
naturally dominates the results because 
all questions are similarly phrased. Had 
questions been asked for differences in 
types  of  corruption,  the  second 
component is likely to have obtained a 
higher Eigenvalue.
6 Second, the second 
factor  derived  here  is  obtained  almost 
equally when processing the 2002 or the 
2004  data  by  the  WEF.  This 
underscores  the  robustness  of  the 
findings.  The  coefficients  for  the  two 
components  are  provided  in  table  3. 
They  reveal  that  corruption  in  public 
contracts,  government  policymaking 
and  judicial  decision  share  the  same 
sign for component 2. On the other hand, corruption in exports and imports, public 
utilities, tax payments and loan applications has a positive sign. The strongest difference 
exists  between  corruption  in  government  policymaking  as  opposed  to  corruption  in 
public utilities.  
 
                                                 
6 In this respect the Kaiser criterion is not invariant to matrix operations, such as substituting corruption in 
public utilities by the difference of this type of corruption to that in government programs. 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained, Data on 
Corruption by the WEF 2003 
Component  Initial Eigenvalues 





1  6,333  90,464  90,464 
2  0,325  4,640  95,105 
Table 3: Coefficient Matrix,  
Data on Corruption by the WEF 2003 
Extraction method:  
Principal Component Analysis. 
   Component 
   1  2 
Absence of Corruption, 
Export and Import  ,972  ,059 
Absence of Corruption, 
Public Utilities  ,930  ,306 
Absence of Corruption, 
Tax Payments  ,965  ,100 
Absence of Corruption, 
Public Contracts  ,958  -,146 
Absence of Corruption, 
Loan Applications  ,947  ,223 
Absence of Corruption, 
Laws and Policies  ,950  -,273 
Absence of Corruption, 
Judicial Decisions  ,935  -,269  
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Component 1 depicts the overall absence of corruption. Component 2 is orthogonal to 
the  first  component  and  relates  to  the  particular  type  of  corruption.  High  values  of 
component  2  indicate  the  prevalence  of  corruption  in  laws  and  policies,  in  judicial 
decisions and public contracts. These tend to be grand forms of corruption, requiring 
less organizational hazards and inducements for investors to defraud their own firm. 
Low values of component 2 indicate the prevalence of corruption in public utilities and 
loan applications (and to a lower extent in taxes as well as in export and import). This 
relates to petty corruption that involves additional organizational efforts. 
 
5.  Interpreting Components  
As  shown  in  table  4,  the  businesspeople  surveyed  by  the  World  Economic  Forum 
perceive  South  America,  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  and  Eastern  Europe 
including countries of the Former Soviet Union to be affected by grand corruption. In 
particular,  this  embraces  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, 
Nicaragua,  Peru,  Philippines,  Slovak  Republic  and  Venezuela.  On  the  other  hand, 
Africa is characterized by petty corruption. The countries with the lowest values for 
component 2 are Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Zambia.  
 
Regressions  3-5  support  my  interpretation  that  component  2  is  a  grand  type  of 
corruption. Additional data from the WEF survey data are used in regression 3 to reveal 
that component 2 decreases with public trust in politicians, with the absence of legal 
political donations in exchange for public decisions and with the extent of bureaucratic 
red tape. All three variables relate to petty rather than grand corruption, because grand 
corruption  would  go  along  with  legal  political  donations,  involve  little  trust  in 
politicians and has little to do with bureaucratic red tape.  
 
Regression  4  and  5  check  these  findings  by  using  alternative  data  on  types  of 
corruption. The above mentioned survey data on opportunism in corrupt deals by the 
World Bank and the University of Basel obtains a negative impact on component 2. 
This suggests that grand corruption is more predictable. However, as I will show in 
subsequent regressions, component 2 has a stronger impact on FDI as compared to the 
data on opportunism. 
 
Gallup  International  incorporated  questions  on  corruption  commissioned  by 
Transparency International in its 2004 survey “Voice of the People”, an annual poll of 
the general public in 54 countries. One question was: “Question1.7: In your opinion, 
how would you describe the following problem facing your country: Grand or political 
corruption that is corruption at the highest levels of society, by leading political elites, 
major companies, etc?” Also petty corruption was asked for: “Petty or administrative 
corruption that is corruption in ordinary people s daily lives, such as bribes paid for 
licenses, traffic violations, etc?” From this data I determine the difference as a measure 
of the prevalence of grand over petty forms of corruption. This assessment must be 
taken with some skepticism. With the caveat that the public may not be well informed 
about  grand  corruption;  responses  might  be  biased  by  the  freedom  of  the  media  in 
reporting on grand corruption, this variable might still be regarded as a valid proxy. As 
shown  in  table  4,  this  index  obtains  the  expected  sign.  Although  it  fails  to  reach 
conventional levels of significance – somewhat due to the small sample – the coefficient 
is still supportive to my interpretation. 
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Table 4. OLS,
 a) 
Dependent Variable: Component 2: Grand Type of Corruption 
Independent Variables  1.   2.  3.  4.  5. 
0.36  0.30  1.208  0.15  1.24  Constant 
(10.1)  (0.9)  (2.6)  (-0.5)  (1.7) 
  -0.006  0.041  0.105  -0.017  GDP per head, log.  
  (0.2)  (1.3)  (2.8)  (-0.2) 
-0.19  -0.18  -0.146      Dummy variable, 
Africa  (-3.1)  (-1.8)  (-1.7)     
0.27  0.30  0.105      Dummy variable, 
Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union 
(3.4)  (3.3) 
(1.3) 
   
0.69  0.70  0.439      Dummy variable, 
South America  (6.0)  (5.6)  (3.6)     
0.44  0.45  0.196      Dummy variable, 
Central America and 
Caribbean 
(3.9)  (3.6) 
(1.6) 
   
-0.07  -0.07  -0.050      Dummy variable,  
Asia  (-0.6)  (-0.7)  (-0.7)     
      -0.18  -0.20  Opportunism in corrupt 
deals        (-2.8)  (-2.5) 
        0.65  Grand – petty 
corruption          (1.5) 
    -0.101      Absence of Legal 
Political Donations, 
WEF 2003 
   
(-2.2) 
   
    -0.076      Public Trust in 
Politicians, WEF 2003      (-2.3)     
    -0.199      Bureaucratic Red Tape, 
WEF 2003      (-2.6)     
Obs.  102  100  100  55  31 
R
2  0.51  0.52  0.62  0.11  0.17 
a)  White corrected t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
6.  Grand Corruption and FDI 
Figure 1 presents average FDI inflows relative to GDP
7 dependent on the extent of 
corruption (component 1) and the type of corruption (component 2). This figure reveals 
that, unsurprisingly, in case of low levels of corruption its type is of little relevance. In 
case of high levels of corruption grand corruption is preferred to petty corruption.  
 
                                                 
7  Since  I  use  logged  data  in  the  subsequent  regressions  I  also  determined  logged  values  for  each 
individual countries belonging to the respective category. For these logged values the average has been 
determined and afterwards the value transformed back to the original scale (by using the result as the 
exponent).   


















Figure 1: Average FDI and Corruption
 
 
Components 1 and 2 are now incorporated in regressions on FDI in table 5. Both of 
them  enter  significantly,  as  shown  in  regression  1.  Due  to  construction,  absence  of 
corruption (component 1) ranges between 15 and 45 with a standard deviation of 7.5. 
An improvement in absence of corruption by one standard deviation would increase the 
logarithm of the ratio of FDI to GDP by 0.67. This represents almost a doubling of FDI. 
Component 2 has a standard deviation of 0.4. Increasing component 2 (grand corruption 
as  opposed  to  petty  corruption)  by  one  standard  deviation  could  be  achieved  by 
decreasing absence of corruption in public utilities by 1.3 (on a scale from 1 to 7) or by 
increasing absence of corruption in government programs by 1.4 (on a scale from 1 to 
7). Such an increase of component 2 would increase the logarithm of the ratio of FDI to 
GDP by 0.3, which is an increase by 35%.  
 
The  results  survive  the  inclusion  of  further  explanatory  variables.  Two  potential 
variables  that  emanate  from  growth  theory  are  the  domestic  savings  rate  and  the 
population growth rate. Data from the World Development Indicators were tested, but 
the variables were found to be insignificant without affecting other coefficients. The 
results are thus not reported. Countries that are better integrated in the world economy 
are likely to attract more FDI. This can be proxied by openness, the sum of import and 




The values on FDI are biased towards smaller countries. The larger a country, the more 
of  the  investment  flows  are  from  within  the  borders  and  not  recorded  as  FDI. 
Investments from California to New York are not counted as an incoming FDI, but 
                                                 
8 Openness may capture also a certain fraction of the corruption variable, because corruption tends to 
reduce a country’s openness. The evidence on this link is mixed, however. Ades and Di Tella [1995, 1997 
and 1999] provide supportive evidence, Treisman [2000], Wei [2000a] and Knack and Azfar [2003] 
produce insignificant results.   
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those from Germany to Portugal are. To account for this bias I include the (logarithm 
of) population. It obtains the expected sign, alas missing standard significance levels, 
(regression 3, table 5). This finding is also obtained in other specifications, suggesting 
the exclusion of this variable from the subsequent regressions. 
 
Exporters  of  raw  materials  stand  a  better  chance  in  attracting  gross  FDI  because 
extraction offers additional opportunities for investment. As a proxy for this I include a 
variable on the export of fuels relative to merchandise exports. Indeed, the variable is 
significant and carries the expected sign. High growth rates at the beginning of the 90s 
might have provided investors with a promising signal. I include average GDP growth 
between 1990 and 1995. But the variable is insignificant, as shown in regression 3.  
 
Considering the potential motivation of foreign investors, one cannot ignore the location 
of a country. The more distant a country to the USA and Western Europe the less likely 
they might experience incoming FDI. The data on distance can reach up to π=3.14 for 
one distance. Adding up the distance to Chicago and that to Frankfurt must necessarily 
be below 2π. The highest value was reached by New Zealand with 5.0. High values are 
also obtained by other South East Asian countries but also by Madagascar with 3.7. The 
lowest value is obtained by Ireland with 1.1. Table 5 shows the coefficient for distance 
to global investors to be around -0.2. This means that Ireland experiences almost double 
the FDI inflows as compared to Indonesia.  
 
I include a variable on the extent of bureaucratic red tape. The inclusion of this variable 
tests whether investors are guided by governance indicators other than corruption and 
whether this variable dominates either component 1 or 2. However, this variable is 
insignificant, as revealed in regression 4.  
 
Regression  5  controls  for  opportunism  in  corrupt  deals,  as  determined  by  the  1997 
survey  of  the  World  Bank  and  the  University  of  Basel.  Based  on  the  arguments 
mentioned in the introduction, I expect international investors to be deterred by this type 
of  opportunism  which  goes  along  with  little  predictability.  However,  the  variable 
obtains  an  unexpected  positive  sign  and  is  even  significant.  This  suggests  that,  in 
contrast to the findings by Campos, Lien and Pradhan [1999], international investors are 
less concerned with predictability. Their perception of grand versus petty corruption is 
more relevant, at least as far as their FDI decisions are concerned. I drop this variable 
from subsequent regressions because data is available only for a reduced sample of 
countries.  
 
Regression  6  employs  weighted  least  squares.  Gross  FDI  are  subject  to  random 
influences. If a small island recovers from a volcano eruption or profits from the sudden 
detection of natural resources, FDI could go well beyond the country’s GDP. The same 
shock  would  have  only  a  small  relative  impact  on  a  large  industrial  country. 
Considering that this measurement error increases with a country’s size, I consider the 
(logarithm) of a country’s total population to be an appropriate weight. The resulting 
regression supports this approach. Absence of corruption and the type of corruption are 
once again significant. 
 
Including continental dummies would be another possible test. However, I argue below 
that the reputation of a country’s type of corruption might not be well known. Investors 
are  likely  to  assume  countries  to  perform  similarly  when  they  belong  to  the  same 
continent. In this case, continent dummies would capture too large a share of component 
2.  Indeed,  once  controlling  for  continent  dummies  component  2  becomes  less  
  14 
significant. I thus introduce the assumption that investor’s dislike of some continents is 
due to their petty type of corruption and not other unobserved factors. Given this, I will 
use continent dummies as instruments.  
 
Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares and Weighted Least Squares,
 a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows  
relative to GDP, 1995-2003 
Independent Variables  1.   2.  3.  4.  5.  6. WLS  7. TSLS
b) 
-0.164  -0.344  0.655  1.078  1.151  1.413  2.146  Constant 
(-0.2)  (-0.4)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (1)  (1.2)  (1.4) 
-0.035  -0.044  -0.111  -0.175  -0.337  -0.346  -0.760  GDP per head, log.  
(-0.2)  (-0.3)  (-0.7)  (-1.1)  (-1.7)  (-2.0)  (-2.1) 
0.089  0.076  0.081  0.090  0.077  0.117  0.200  Component 1: Absence 
of Corruption,   (4.5)  (4.0)  (3.9)  (4.6)  (2.4)  (4.9)  (3.4) 
0.748  0.793  0.721  0.731  1.031  0.909  1.709  Component 2: Grand 
Type of Corruption,   (3.5)  (3.8)  (3.3)  (3.1)  (3.3)  (4.1)  (3.7) 
  0.078  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.008  0.007  Openness, % of GDP 
  (4.9)  (4.5)  (5.6)  (4.7)  (3.9)  (3.9) 
    -0.063          Population, log, 2001 
      (-1.1)         
    0.012  0.012  0.002  0.009  0.015  Export of Fuels, rel. to 
merchandise exports, 
1994-2003       (3.1)  (3.3)  (0.3)  (2.3)  (3.7) 
    0.025          Growth of GDP, 1990-
95      (1.5)         
    -0.226  -0.192  -0.256  -0.261  -0.238  Distance to Global 
Investors      (-2.5)  (-2.5)  (-2.3)  (-2.5)  (-2.9) 
      -0.136        Bureaucratic Red Tape, 
WEF 2003        (-0.6)       
        0.403      Opportunism in corrupt 
deals          (2.9)     
Obs.  95  95  94  94  54  94  94 
R
2  0.39  0.51  0.60  0.59  0.62  0.76  0.36 
Adj. R
2  0.37  0.49  0.56  0.55  0.57  0.75  0.32 
Jarque-Bera  2.1  2.3  3.4  2.8  0.5  2.2  1.2 
a)  White corrected t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
b)  Instruments are the share of Protestants and dummies for Africa, Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union, Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean. 
 
I check the results by employing the instrumental variables technique in regression 7. 
The reason is less related to reverse causality; an impact of FDI on perceived levels of 
corruption does not appear plausible. Even if we think that countries that experienced 
large FDI inflows might be perceived differently among investors we would not know 
whether the perceived level of corruption increases or decreases. The reason for using 
instruments is rather related to measurement errors. The perceptions data on corruption 
does not perfectly capture reality and is subject to margins of error. With the help of 
instruments we avoid the resulting biased coefficients. Another concern relates to an 
omitted variable bias. This problem would be relevant to the results if they correlate 
with  corruption  and  with  FDI  inflows  at  the  same  time.  Again,  by  making  use  of 
instruments this type of bias is avoided – certainly requiring that the instruments are 
also uncorrelated to omitted variables.   
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I take the share of Protestants as an instrument for the level of corruption, component 1. 
The argument is that Protestantism is a less hierarchical religion, where individuals are 
less embedded in networks that pursue the material benefit of their members at the 
expense  of  society  at  large,  [Treisman  2000,  Paldam  2001,  Lambsdorff  2002b]. 
Instruments  for  component  2  are  naturally  rare.  Mo  (2001)  suggests  the  use  of 
continental dummies as instruments for corruption. Given their significant impact on 
component 2, as shown in table 4, I use them as instruments for the type of corruption 
instead. The underlying assumption is that, given the many other explanatory variables, 
continents have no other impact on FDI, except through their type of corruption. The 
reputation of a country may also be relevant to how its neighbors are perceived. This 
would  even  strengthen  the  impact  of  component  2  when  using  continents  as 




However, the significance of component 2 would not survive TSLS when incorporating 
continental dummies as explanatory variables for FDI. This suggests that the impact of 
component  2  is  closely  related  to  continents  being  perceived  differently  among 
investors.  Given  that  the  knowledge  on  types  of  corruption  is  naturally  not  well 
developed,  it  is  plausible  that  continental  dummies  even  surpass  component  2  in 
explaining variations of FDI. In sum, the results survive instrumental variable technique 
when assuming that investor’s dislike of some continents is due to their petty type of 
corruption and not other unobserved factors. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Pointing out once again that corruption deters FDI is easily accepted as an indicator that 
anti-corruption must be strengthened. Another potential policy recommendation of my 
findings relates to public utilities. The strong result for public utilities suggests priorities 
for  anti-corruption.  Reducing  corruption  in  public  utilities  could  clearly  help  attract 
international investors. 
 
One policy recommendation cannot be derived from this paper: There is no reason to 
turn a blind eye to grand corruption. International investors might legitimately prefer 
grand corruption as the lesser of two evils because it goes along with less organizational 
intricacies. But they might also prefer grand corruption as an opportunity for defrauding 
their  own  firm.  Shame  on  them?  At  least  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  such 
fraudulent investments  would also profit society. Thus, unless we know the precise 
reasons for international investors to prefer grand corruption we are not in a position to 
set priorities for anti-corruption.  
 
Further research is needed to find out whether grand corruption is less detrimental to 
welfare.  Such  investigations  must  embrace  more  than  just  investor’s  calculus. 
Productivity  and  growth  of  GDP  might  be  affected  by  the  type  of  corruption.  Tax 
revenues  might  deteriorate  and  government  programs  might  promote  useless  white-
                                                 
9 Another potential instrument for component 2 is the absence of Legal Political Donations and Public 
Trust in Politicians. They might also be measured with imprecision, but once this measurement error is 
uncorrelated  with  that  of  component  2  their  usage  as  instruments  provides  a  further  check  to  the 
robustness of the findings. The findings also survive the use of this instrument. The results become more 
significant when using weighted TSLS. Similar results are obtained when instrumenting separately for the 
two components.  
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elephant projects when affected by grand corruption. These are repercussions that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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9.  Appendix 
The 95 countries included in regressions 1 and 2 (without Luxembourg) are:  
 
   
Average An-















1  Angola  7.79  0.62  21.50 
2  Argentina  1.69  1.24  22.99 
3  Australia  1.79  0.34  42.79 
4  Austria  2.02  0.21  40.59 
5  Bangladesh  0.06  -0.46  15.78 
6  Belgium  8.43  0.45  36.98 
7  Bolivia  3.25  1.50  22.52 
8  Botswana  0.68  0.16  35.74 
9  Brazil  1.59  0.62  28.99 
10  Bulgaria  1.53  0.53  33.77 
11  Cameroon  0.03  -0.16  20.46 
12  Canada  2.66  0.40  37.36 
13  Chile  3.25  0.97  37.19 
14  China,P.R.: Mainland  0.86  0.15  31.01 
15  China,P.R.:Hong Kong  14.20  0.19  40.98 
16  Colombia  0.99  0.99  30.72 
17  Costa Rica  1.67  0.57  30.03 
18  Croatia  2.95  0.56  28.24 
19  Czech Republic  2.89  0.81  29.94 
20  Denmark  6.58  0.16  44.79 
21  Dominican Republic  1.44  0.95  25.46 
22  Ecuador  2.42  1.18  24.26 
23  Egypt  0.33  -0.30  28.91 
24  El Salvador  0.96  1.23  34.25 
25  Estonia  3.08  0.65  36.13 
26  Finland  3.93  0.16  43.93 
27  France  2.62  0.54  37.93 
28  Gambia, The  0.51  -0.16  29.76 
29  Germany  2.20  0.24  41.63 
30  Ghana  0.35  -0.17  25.96 
31  Greece  0.50  0.69  30.21 
32  Guatemala  0.51  1.50  22.82 
33  Haiti  0.06  0.50  17.70 
34  Honduras  1.07  0.63  19.70 
35  Hungary  2.15  0.66  34.61 
36  Iceland  1.63  0.14  44.70 
37  India  0.12  0.25  25.18 
38  Indonesia  0.07  0.00  24.15 
39  Ireland  14.27  0.72  36.89 
40  Israel  2.12  0.28  40.50 
41  Italy  0.67  0.70  30.70 
                                                 
∗ Data source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, New York: Oxford University Press for 
the World Economic Forum. The values are based on a principal component analysis carried out by the 
author.   
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42  Jamaica  4.58  0.41  26.70 
43  Japan  0.16  0.65  36.70 
44  Jordan  1.26  0.32  36.80 
45  Kenya  0.12  0.43  20.83 
46  Korea  0.48  0.42  33.65 
47  Latvia  2.03  0.55  30.61 
48  Lithuania  1.58  0.90  33.28 
49  Luxembourg  544.81  0.29  40.50 
50  Macedonia, FYR  1.22  0.38  22.81 
51  Madagascar  0.26  0.55  20.74 
52  Malawi  0.33  0.23  32.43 
53  Malaysia  1.80  0.31  33.36 
54  Mali  1.10  0.16  18.75 
55  Malta  3.86  0.50  38.12 
56  Mauritius  0.47  0.42  29.83 
57  Mexico  1.62  0.73  31.10 
58  Morocco  0.08  -0.02  24.23 
59  Mozambique  1.47  0.62  22.81 
60  Namibia  0.72  0.26  29.46 
61  Netherlands  7.49  0.30  40.88 
62  New Zealand  3.06  0.14  44.03 
63  Nicaragua  1.81  1.02  24.93 
64  Nigeria  1.23  0.01  19.38 
65  Norway  2.69  0.18  39.74 
66  Pakistan  0.24  0.22  26.16 
67  Panama  4.00  0.88  25.48 
68  Paraguay  0.57  0.78  22.17 
69  Peru  1.60  1.57  29.78 
70  Philippines  0.44  1.15  20.98 
71  Poland  1.50  0.58  28.81 
72  Portugal  1.62  0.39  37.16 
73  Romania  0.79  0.62  20.54 
74  Russia  0.30  0.47  24.82 
75  Senegal  0.62  0.36  24.14 
76  Singapore  10.64  0.16  43.65 
77  Slovak Republic  1.02  1.48  28.99 
78  Slovenia  1.19  0.48  36.03 
79  South Africa  0.50  0.17  31.65 
80  Spain  2.54  0.67  37.66 
81  Sri Lanka  0.29  0.20  24.33 
82  Sweden  8.33  0.21  42.79 
83  Switzerland  4.36  0.33  42.22 
84  Tanzania  1.49  0.11  26.44 
85  Thailand  0.92  0.58  32.30 
86  Trinidad and Tobago  6.06  0.32  28.40 
87  Tunisia  0.84  -0.07  33.94 
88  Turkey  0.27  0.44  25.47 
89  Uganda  0.60  0.09  20.91 
90  Ukraine  0.37  0.42  23.09 
91  United Kingdom  3.78  0.20  41.36 
92  United States  1.51  0.45  38.42 
93  Uruguay  0.69  0.47  36.60 
94  Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  2.31  1.18  23.73 
95  Vietnam  1.06  0.04  27.46 
96  Zambia  2.15  -0.02  25.39 
 